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Abstract
Nash equilibrium constitutes a central solution concept in game theory. The task of detecting the Nash equilibria
of a ﬁnite strategic game remains a challenging problem up-to-date. This paper investigates the effectiveness of three
computational intelligence techniques, namely, covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategies, particle swarm
optimization, as well as, differential evolution, to computeNash equilibria of ﬁnite strategic games, as globalminima
of a real-valued, nonnegative function. An issue of particular interest is to detect more than one Nash equilibria of a
game. The performance of the considered computational intelligence methods on this problem is investigated using
multistart and deﬂection.
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1. Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical theory of socio-economic phenomena exhibiting interaction among
decision-makers, called players, whose actions affect each other. The fundamental assumptions that
underlie the theory are that players pursue well-deﬁned exogenous objectives and take into account
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their knowledge, or expectations, of other players’ behavior [17]. The theory has been so far applied in
the ﬁelds of economics, political science, evolutionary biology, computer science, statistics, accounting,
social psychology, law, and branches of philosophy such as epistemology and ethics [1].
A game is a model of strategic interaction among a number of players, which includes the constraints
on the actions that players can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that players
do take. A solution is a systematic description of the outcomes that may emerge in a game [17]. In this
paper we consider only the family of strategic, or normal form, games. The most commonly encountered
solution concept in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium [15,16]. This notion captures a steady state
of the play of a strategic game, in which each player holds correct expectations concerning the other
players’ behavior and acts rationally.
The problem of detecting the Nash equilibria of a ﬁnite strategic game admits a number of alternative
formulations, yet computing such solutions remains a challenging task up-to-date (for a comprehensive
review on algorithms to compute equilibria of n-person games see [13], for a survey of algorithms
for 2-player games see [28]). Furthermore, an algorithm that computes a single Nash equilibrium is
unsatisfactory for many applications. Even if the resulting equilibrium is perfect, or satisﬁes some other
criterion posed in the literature on reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium, we cannot eliminate the possibility
that other, more salient equilibria exist [13].
The problem of computing a Nash equilibrium can be formulated as a global optimization problem
[12]. This formulation allows us to consider three computational intelligencemethods, namely, covariance
matrix adaptation evolution strategies (CMA-ES), particle swarm optimization (PSO), and differential
evolution (DE), to detect Nash equilibria. CMA-ES, PSO and DE are stochastic optimization methods
capable of handling nondifferentiable, nonlinear and multimodal objective functions. They exploit a
population of potential solutions to probe the search space synchronously. Eachmember of the population
adapts its position towards the most promising regions of the function’s landscape, characterized, in the
case of minimization, by lower function values. Incorporating multistart [30] or deﬂection [11], more
than one global minima of the objective function can be obtained.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a brief exposition of basic concepts
of game theory and the formulation of the problem. In Section 3, the computational intelligence methods
considered, as well as, the techniques employed to compute more than one minimizers of a function, are
described. Section 4 outlines the proposed algorithmic scheme and discusses the experimental results.
The paper ends with conclusions in Section 5.
2. Notation and problem formulation
2.1. Strategic games and Nash equilibrium
A ﬁnite strategic game, = 〈(N), (Si), (ui)〉, is deﬁned by [17],
• a ﬁnite setN= {1, . . . , N} of players,
• for each player i ∈N, a set of actions, pure strategies, Si = {si1, . . . , simi },• for each player i ∈N, a payoff function, ui : S → R, is also deﬁned, where S = S1 × S2 × . . .× SN
is the Cartesian product of all sets Si .
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Next, we give the notation that will be used in the paper. The following is based on [13]. Let Pi be
the set of real valued functions on Si . The notation pij = pi(sij ), is used for the elements pi ∈ Pi .
Let also P = ×i∈NPi and m =∑i∈Nmi . Then P is isomorphic to Rm. We denote elements in P by
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN), where pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pimi ) ∈ Pi . If p ∈ P, and p′i ∈ Pi , then (p′i , p−i)
stands for the element q ∈ P that satisﬁes, qi = p′i and qi = pj for j = i.
Now let i be the set of probability measures on Si . We deﬁne  = ×i∈N i , so  ⊆ Rm. Thus, the
elements pi ∈ i are real valued functions on Si , pi : Si → R and it holds that,∑
sij∈Si
pi(sij )= 1, pi(sij )0, ∀sij ∈ Si.
We use the abusive notation sij to denote the strategy pi ∈ i with pij =1. Hence, the notation (sij , p−i)
represents the strategy where player i adopts the pure strategy sij , and all the other players adopt their
components of p.
The payoff function u is extended to have domain Rm by the rule,
ui(p)=
∑
s∈S
p(s)ui(s), (1)
p(s)=
∏
i∈N
pi(si). (2)
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle, p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2, . . . , p∗N) ∈  is a Nash equilibrium if p∗ ∈  and for all
i ∈N and all pi ∈ i , ui(pi, p∗−i)ui(p∗).
An immediate implication of the above deﬁnition is that for a strategy proﬁle p∗ to be a Nash equilib-
rium, it must be that no player i has an action yielding a payoff that he strictly prefers to the payoff he
receives by choosing p∗i , assuming that every other player j chooses his equilibrium action p∗j . In other
words, no player can proﬁtably deviate, given the actions of other players.
2.2. Problem formulation
As previously mentioned, the problem of ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium of a normal form game can be
formulated as a problem of detecting the global minimum of a real valued function [12]. To this end,
three functions, x, z and g : P→ Rm, are deﬁned. For any p ∈ P, i ∈ N and sij ∈ Si , deﬁne the ijth
component as,
xij (p)=ui(sij , p−i), (3)
zij (p)=xij (p)− ui(p), (4)
gij (p)=max[zij (p), 0]. (5)
Now, we deﬁne the real valued function v :  → R, by,
v(p)=
∑
i∈N
∑
1j mi
[gij (p)]2. (6)
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Function v is continuous, differentiable, and satisﬁes the inequality v(p)0, for all p ∈ . Furthermore,
p∗ is a Nash equilibrium, if and only if, it is a global minimum of v, i.e. v(p∗)= 0 [12,13].
3. Computational intelligence methods considered
3.1. Covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategies
Evolution strategies (ES) are population-based search algorithms developed byRechenberg and Schwe-
fel [22–25]. ES exploit a population of  individuals to probe the search space. At each iteration of the
algorithm,  offsprings are produced by stochastic variation, called mutation, of recombinations of a set
of individuals (called the parents) from the current population. Mutation is typically carried out by adding
a realization of a normally distributed random vector. After the creation of the offspring individuals, a
selection phase takes place, where either the  best individuals among the offspring population, or the 
best individuals among both the parent and the offspring populations are selected to form the population
of the next generation. These two selection schemes are denoted as (, )-ES and (+)-ES, respectively.
ES use a set of parameters, called strategy parameters, to parameterize the normal distribution used
in the mutation procedure. These parameters can either be ﬁxed, or evolve during the evolution process
resulting in self-adaptive ES [2]. Clearly, the parameters of the normal distribution play an important
role in the performance of the ES algorithm [7]. The adaptation of the strategy parameters in ES usually
takes place within the concept of mutative strategy parameter control (MSC). In this context, strategy
parameters are mutated and search points are subsequently generated by means of this mutated strategy
parameter setting.
Covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategies (CMA-ES) have been developed by Hansen and
Ostermeier [6,7]. CMA-ES explicitly realize the objective of MSC, which is to favor strategy parameter
settings that produce individuals that are selected (in the minimization framework, this implies indi-
viduals with lower function values). Instead of utilizing selection information from a single generation
step, CMA-ES utilize a whole path taken by the population over a number of generations. Hansen and
Ostermeier call such paths evolution paths. If successively selected mutation steps are parallel correlated,
the evolution path will be comparatively long, and vice versa if successively selected mutation steps are
anti–parallel correlated. An evolution path is calculated through an iterative process by weighted sum-
mation of successively selected mutation steps (cf. Eq. (9)). Moreover, CMA-ES implements a principal
component analysis of the previously selected mutation steps to determine the new mutation distribution.
An advantage of this approach is that it renders the adaptation mechanism inherently independent of the
coordinate system [7].
The proposed scheme for CMA-ES is (W, ), where W denotes weighted recombination from all
 individuals of the parent population. CMA-ES exploit a set of parameters, pc,G ∈ Rn, CG ∈ Rn×n,
p,G ∈ Rn, and G ∈ R+, where G denotes the generation number. The parameters are initialized as
follows:pc,0=p,0=0 andC0=I (the unitymatrix), while 0 and the initial weightedmean of the  parent
individuals, 〈X〉W,0, have to be chosen problem dependent [7]. The offsprings,Xk,G+1, k= 1, . . . , , are
then determined by the equation,
Xk,G+1 = 〈X〉W,G + G BGDGzk,G+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼N(0,CG)
,
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whereN(0, CG) denotes the Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix CG, and,
〈X〉W,G =
1∑
i=1wi
∑
i=1
wiXi:,G, wi ∈ R+,
with i :  denoting the ith best individual, is the weighted mean of the  best individuals at generation
G; G ∈ R+ is the step size; zk,G+1 ∈ Rn are independent realizations of a (0, I )-normally distributed
random vector. ThematricesBG andDG are deﬁned by the symmetrical positive deﬁnite n×n covariance
matrix CG, as follows [7],
CG = BGDG(BGDG) = BG(DG)2BG.
This is actually a singular value decomposition of CG. Thus, the matrix DG is an n× n diagonal matrix
with its diagonal elements being equal to the square roots of the eigenvalues of CG, while, BG is an n×n
orthogonal matrix that determines the coordinate system, where the scaling with DG takes place and its
columns are the normalized eigenvectors of CG. The matrix CG is updated by means of the evolution
path pc,G+1,
pc,G+1 = (1− cc)pc,G + cuc cwBGDG〈z〉W,G+1, (7)
CG+1 = (1− ccov)CG + ccovpc,G+1pc,G+1, (8)
where, pc,G stands for the weighted differences of points 〈x〉W; cc ∈ [0, 1] determines the cumulation
time for pc; cuc =
√
cc(2− cc) normalizes the variance of the pc,
cW =
∑
i=1wi√∑
i=1w2i
, 〈z〉W,G+1 =
1∑
i=1wi
∑
i=1
wizi:,G+1,
and ccov ∈ [0, 1] determines the change rate of the matrix C. The evolution of the global step-size G is
determined by a “conjugate” evolution path, p,G+1,
p,G+1 = (1− c)p,G + cucWBG〈z〉W,G+1, (9)
G+1 = G exp
(
1
d
‖ p,G+1 ‖ −ˆn
ˆn
)
, (10)
where, c determines the cumulation time; cu =
√
c(2− c); d is a damping parameter that affects the
feasible change rate of G; and ˆn represents the expectation of the length of a (0, I )-normally distributed
random vector.
3.2. Particle swarm optimization
Particle swarm optimization (PSO) belongs to the class of swarm intelligence algorithms. The ideas
that underlie PSO are inspired not by the evolutionary mechanisms encountered in natural selection, but
rather by the social behavior of ﬂocking organisms, such as swarms of birds and ﬁsh schools. It has
been observed that the behavior of the individuals that comprise a ﬂock adheres to fundamental rules
like nearest-neighbor velocity matching and acceleration by distance [9,10]. In this respect, it has been
claimed that PSO performs mutation with a conscience [10].
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PSO is a population-based algorithm that exploits a population of individuals, to synchronously probe
promising regions of the search space. In this context, the population is called a swarm, and the individuals
are called particles. Each particle moves with an adaptable velocity within the search space, and retains
in its memory the best position it ever encountered. In the global variant of PSO the best position ever
attained by all individuals of the swarm is communicated to all the particles. In the local variant, each
particle is assigned to a neighborhood consisting of a prespeciﬁed number of particles. In this case, the
best position ever attained by the particles that comprise the neighborhood is communicated among them
[10,19].
Assume an n-dimensional search space, S ⊂ Rn, and a swarm consisting of NP particles. The ith
particle is in effect an n-dimensional vector Xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xin). The velocity of this particle is
also an n-dimensional vector, Vi = (vi1, vi2, . . . , vin). The best previous position encountered by the
ith particle is a point in S, denoted as BPi = (bpi1, bpi2, . . . , bpin). Assume g to be the index of the
particle that attained the best previous position among all the individuals of the swarm, and G to be the
iteration counter.
Then, according to the constriction factor version of PSO, the velocity of the ith particle of the swarm
is determined by the following equation [3],
Vi,G+1 = [Vi,G + c1r1(BPi,G −Xi,G)+ c2r2(BPg,G −Xi,G)], (11)
where i=1, 2, . . . ,NP;  is the constriction factor; c1 and c2 are called the cognitive and social parameters,
respectively; and r1, r2 are random numbers uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Alternatively, the
update of the velocity of the particle can be performed through the inertia weight variant of the algorithm
[4,26,27],
Vi,G+1 = wV i,G + c1r1(BPi,G −Xi,G)+ c2r2(BPg,G −Xi,G), (12)
where w is called the inertia weight. The position of the ith particle in iteration G+ 1 is computed by,
Xi,G+1 =Xi,G + Vi,G+1. (13)
Both the constriction factor, , and the inertia weight,w, are mechanisms for the control of the magnitude
of velocities. However, there are some major differences regarding the way these two are computed and
applied. The constriction factor is derived analytically through the formula [3],
= 2
|2− −
√
2 − 4|
, (14)
for > 4, where = c1 + c2, and = 1. Different conﬁgurations of , as well as a thorough theoretical
analysis of the derivation of Eq. (14), can be found in [3,31]. The inertia weight, w, in Eq. (12), is
employed to manipulate the impact of the previous history of velocities on the current velocity. Therefore,
w resolves the trade-off between the global and local exploration ability of the swarm. A large inertia
weight encourages global exploration (visiting unexplored areas of the search space), while a small one
promotes local exploration, i.e. probing the current search area.A suitable value forw provides the desired
balance between the global and local exploration ability of the swarm, and consequently improves the
effectiveness of the algorithm. Therefore, it is preferable to initialize the inertia weight to a large value,
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giving priority to global exploration of the search space, and gradually decrease it, so as to obtain reﬁned
solutions [26,27]. This ﬁnding is intuitively very appealing. In conclusion, an initial value ofw around 1.0
and a gradual decline towards 0 is considered a proper choice forw. The initialization of the swarm and the
velocities, is usually performed randomly in the search space, although more sophisticated initialization
techniques can enhance the overall performance of the algorithm [18].
Thorough theoretical investigations of the convergence properties of PSO through analyzing the tra-
jectories of the particles are provided in [3,31]. These studies are based on analyzing initially a simpliﬁed
deterministic model of the algorithm in order to provide an understanding about how it probes the search
space, and then continue on to analyze the full stochastic system [3,31]. Generalized models of the al-
gorithm are proposed, and techniques for controlling the convergence properties of the particle system
through the ﬁne-tuning of the parameters are analyzed in [3,31].
3.3. Differential evolution
Storn and Price [29] introduced a novel minimization method, called differential evolution (DE), capa-
ble of handling nondifferentiable, nonlinear andmultimodal objective functions. DE exploits a population
of NP potential solutions, called individuals, that are n-dimensional vectors, to probe the search space.
At each generation, G, of the algorithm three operators, namely, mutation, recombination and selection,
are performed in order to obtain more accurate approximations to a solution [21]. All individuals are
uniformly initialized in the search space. At the mutation step, for each i = 1, . . . ,NP, a new mutant
vector Vi,G+1 is generated by combining a number of vectors from the population of the current genera-
tion. Speciﬁcally, for each individual Xi,G, i = 1, . . . ,NP, a new individual Vi,G+1 (mutant individual)
is generated according to one of the following equations,
Vi,G+1=Xbest,G +Q(Xr1,G −Xr2,G), (15)
Vi,G+1=Xr1,G +Q(Xr2,G −Xr3,G), (16)
Vi,G+1=Xi,G +Q(Xbest,G −Xi,G)+Q(Xr1,G −Xr2,G), (17)
Vi,G+1=Xbest,G +Q(Xr1,G −Xr2,G)+Q(Xr3,G −Xr4,G), (18)
Vi,G+1=Xr1,G +Q(Xr2,G −Xr3,G)+Q(Xr4,G −Xr5,G), (19)
Vi,G+1=(Xr1,G +Xr2,G +Xr3,G)/3+ (p2 − p1)(Xr1,G −Xr2,G)
+ (p3 − p2)(Xr2,G −Xr3,G)+ (p1 − p3)(Xr3,G −Xr1,G), (20)
where Xbest,G denotes the best individual of the previous generation; Q> 0 is a real parameter, called
mutation constant, which controls the ampliﬁcation of the difference between two individuals so as to
avoid the stagnation of the search process; and r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,NP}, are random integers
mutually different and different from the running index i. The mutation strategy of Eq. (20) is known
as the trigonometric mutation strategy, and has been recently proposed in [5]. This strategy performs a
mutation according to Eq. (20) with probability 	Q and a mutation according to Eq. (16) with probability
(1− 	Q). The values of pi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and p′ are obtained through the following equations,
p1=|f (Xr1,G)|/p′,
p2=|f (Xr2,G)|/p′,
p3=|f (Xr3,G)|/p′,
p′=|f (Xr1,G)| + |f (Xr2,G)| + |f (Xr3,G)|.
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At this point it is worth noting that performance differences caused by the selection of the mutation
strategy for DE will be provided in Section 4.
The resultingmutant vectors aremixedwith a predetermined vector, called target vector. This operation
is called recombination (crossover), and it gives rise to the trial vector. At the recombination step, for
each component j = 1, 2, ..., n, of the mutant vector, a random number r ∈ [0, 1] is generated. If r is
smaller than the predeﬁned recombination constant, CR ∈ [0, 1], the jth component of the mutant vector
Vi,G+1 becomes the jth component of the trial vector. Otherwise, the jth component of the target vector,
Xi,G, is selected as the jth component of the trial vector, which is deﬁned by,
Ui,G+1 = (ui1,G+1, ui2,G+1, . . . , uin,G+1),
where
uij,G+1 =
{
vij,G+1, if (randb(j)CR) or j = rnbr(i),
xij,G, if (randb(j)>CR) and j = rnbr(i),
where j = 1, 2, . . . , n; randb(j) is the jth evaluation of a uniform random number generator within the
range [0, 1]; and rnbr(i) is a randomly chosen index from the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Finally, at the selection step, the trial vector obtained after the recombination step is accepted for the
next generation, if and only if, it yields a reduction of the value of the objective function, f (·), relative to
the previous vector, Xi,G; if not, Xi,G is retained,
Xi,G+1 =
{
Ui,G+1, if f (Ui,G+1)< f (Xi,G),
Xi,G, otherwise.
3.4. Detecting more than one minimizers
The most simple technique to compute more than one minimizers of a function is multistart [30]. In
this approach, as soon as a minimizer is detected the algorithm is reinitialized in the search space. This
approach, however, does not guarantee that the algorithm will not converge to one of the previously
detected minimizers.
The deﬂection technique, proposed in [11], is an alternative technique that allows multiple minimizers
to be obtained in a single run of an optimization algorithm. Let f : S → R, S ⊂ Rn, be the original
objective function under consideration. Let also x∗i , i=1, . . . , m, bemminimizers of f. Then, the deﬂection
technique deﬁnes a new function F(x) as follows,
F(x)= T1(x; x1, 1)−1 · · · Tm(x; xm, m)−1f (x), (21)
where i , i = 1, . . . , m, are relaxation parameters, and T1, . . . , Tm, are appropriate functions in the sense
that the resulting function F has exactly the same minimizers as f, except at points x∗1 , . . . , x∗m. The
functions,
Ti(x; xi, i)= tanh(i ‖ x − x∗i ‖), i = 1, . . . , m, (22)
satisfy this property, known as the deﬂection property, as shown in [11]. Therefore, when the optimization
algorithm detects a minimizer, x∗i , of the objective function, the algorithm is restarted and an additional
Ti(x; xi, i) is included in the objective function F(x).
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Alternative conﬁgurations of the parameter  result in different shapes of the transformed function.
For larger values of  the effect of the deﬂection technique on the objective function is relatively mild.
On the other hand, using < 1 results in a function F with considerably larger function values in the
neighborhood of the deﬂected minimizer. Deﬂection has been effectively used with PSO for detecting
periodic orbits of nonlinear mappings [20].
4. The proposed approach and experimental results
4.1. Proposed algorithm
The proposed algorithm for detecting several Nash equilibria, can be summarized in the following
three steps:
Step 1: Apply one of the aforementioned optimization methods to detect a global minimizer (Nash
equilibrium) of the objective function.
Step 2: Once a global minimizer is detected store it.
Step 3: If the number of restarts allowed is not exceeded, apply multistart or deﬂection and go to
Step 1. Otherwise, terminate the algorithm and report the results.
4.2. Test problems
The performance of the algorithm on ﬁnding Nash equilibria, was studied on six benchmark problems
which are included in the latest stable version (ver. 0.97.0.5) of the state-of-the-art GAMBIT software
suite [14] (GAMBIT is freely available from http://econweb.tamu.edu/gambit/). All games
were characterized by more than one Nash equilibria. In all problems, the main goal was to detect several
(and if possible all the) equilibria. To obtain the list of Nash equilibria of each game, the GAMBIT routine
PolEnumSolve was used. Next, the test problems used are reported. For games with more than three
players the payoff matrices are not reported due to space limitations. The name of the GAMBIT ﬁle that
corresponds to each game is mentioned so that the reader can obtain all the information about these games
from GAMBIT.
Test Problem 1. This is a four-person, normal form game, with 2 pure strategies available to each player.
The game is characterized by three equilibria. The GAMBIT ﬁle that corresponds to this game is named
2x2x2x2.nfg.
Test Problem 2. This is another four-person, normal form game, with 2 pure strategies available to each
player. The game is characterized by ﬁve mixed equilibria. The GAMBIT ﬁle that corresponds to this
game is named g3.nfg.
Test Problem 3. This is a ﬁve player game, with two pure strategies available to each player. The
game is characterized by ﬁve Nash equilibria. The GAMBIT ﬁle that corresponds to this game is named
2x2x2x2x2.nfg.
Test Problem 4. This is a normal form game with three players and two pure strategies available to each
player [12]. The payoffs of this game are given in Table 1. This game has a total of 9 Nash equilibria,
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Table 1
Payoff matrices for Test Problem 4
s31 s21 s22 s32 s21 s22
s11 9, 8, 12 0, 0, 0 s11 0, 0, 0 3, 4, 6
s12 0, 0, 0 9, 8, 2 s12 3, 4, 4 0, 0, 0
Table 2
Payoff matrix for Test Problem 6
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11 3, 2 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
s12 0, 0 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0
s13 0, 0 0, 0 1, 4 0, 0
s14 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 4, 7
Table 3
Number of restarts for each test problem
Test problem 1 2 3 4 5 6
Restarts 8 10 10 15 18 20
four pure strategy equilibria, three mixed strategy equilibria, and and two full support strategy equilibria.
The GAMBIT ﬁle that corresponds to this game is 2x2x2.nfg.
TestProblem5. This is a three player coordination gamewith three strategies available to eachplayer.The
game is characterizedby13equilibria.TheGAMBITﬁle that corresponds to this game iscoord333.nfg.
Test Problem 6. This is a two-player game with four strategies available to each player. This game has a
total of 15 Nash equilibria. The GAMBIT ﬁle that corresponds to this game is coord4.nfg (Table 2).
4.3. Experimental setup
Numerical experiments were performed using a DE, a PSO, and a CMA-ES, C++ Interface developed
under the Fedora Linux 1.0 operating system using the GNU compiler collection (gcc) version 3.3.2. For
the singular value decomposition performed by the CMA-ES algorithm the C Linear Algebra PACKage
(CLAPACK) 3.0 and the Automatically Tuned Linear Algebra Software (ATLAS) 3.4.2 libraries were
used.
For each test problem, all the algorithms were allowed to perform a number of restarts depending on
the number of Nash equilibria of the game under consideration. Each algorithm was allowed to perform
a prespeciﬁed number of iterations per restart. The stopping criterion employed was to achieve a function
value less than or equal to 10−8. Otherwise, the algorithm was reinitialized when the maximum number
of iterations per restart was reached. The number of restarts for each test problem is illustrated in
Table 3. When the deﬂection technique was used, the values of the relaxation parameters, i of
Eq. (21), were set to 1.
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Table 4
Default parameter setting for the CMA-ES algorithm [7]
  wi=1,..., cc ccov c d
4+ 3 ln(n) /2 ln( +12 )− ln(i) 4n+4 2(n+√2)2
4
n+4 c−1 + 1
Table 5
Population size and iterations per restart for DE and PSO
Problem Pop. size Iterations
TP1 20 1000
TP2 20 1000
TP3 50 2000
TP4 10 1000
TP5 20 1000
TP6 10 1000
For each point, X, to be a Nash equilibrium of a game it must be a minimizer of Eq. (6) and X ∈ ,
as deﬁned in Section 2. To evaluate the function value of each individual, X, we use the following
normalization:
x
p
ij =
‖ xij ‖∑mi
j=1 ‖ xij ‖
,
with i ∈N, and j = 1, . . . , mi , which ensures that Xp ∈ . Note that this normalization is used only to
compute the objective function of Eq. (6) and not to constrain the populations to lie in . Our experience
indicates that if the normalized individuals, Xp, replace the original individuals, X, then the diversity of
the population decreases drastically and this in turn causes the premature convergence of the considered
methods.
For the CMA-ES, the default parameter setup suggested in [7] was adopted. This setup is illustrated
in Table 4. The initial component-wise standard deviation of the mutation step, 0, was set to 1.0 for all
games. Moreover, the maximum number of generations per restart was set to 1000.
For the DE algorithm, the values for the mutation constant,Q, and the recombination constant CRwere
set to 0.7 and 0.9, respectively, following the suggestions in [29]. Concerning the trigonometric mutation
strategy deﬁned by Eq. (20), the value of the parameter 	Q was set to 0.1 [5]. Population size, as well as,
the number of generations per restart were problem dependent. The setup used for these parameters was
the same for DE and PSO and their values are reported in Table 5.
Concerning the PSO method, the global variant of the algorithm was considered because it exhibited
faster convergence compared to the local variant. In contrast to DE and CMA-ES, the particles were
constrained in the box [−1, 1]n, where n stands for the dimension of the problem, in order to avoid
possible velocities explosion. In the constriction factor version, the values of the c1 and c2 parameters
were set to 2.05, while  was set to 0.729 [3]. An upper bound, Vmax, on the absolute value of the
velocities of the particles was used and set to 1. In the inertia weight version, the inertia weight w was
initialized to 1.0 and it gradually declined towards zero for the 75% of the available iterations. Swarm
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Table 6
Results for Test Problem 1 with deﬂection
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 2.97 0.18 2 3 8830.08 2048.87 6644.00 17638.00
DE1 2.97 0.18 2 3 21297.67 6006.98 11493.33 44170.00
DE2 2.93 0.25 2 3 25512.56 6892.15 19706.67 49220.00
DE3 2.97 0.18 2 3 22237.22 6631.78 17160.00 52670.00
DE4 3.00 0.00 3 3 21990.89 3364.67 17406.67 29346.67
DE5 3.00 0.00 3 3 25781.78 3448.10 21273.33 32780.00
DE6 3.00 0.00 3 3 23996.67 3220.54 20340.00 30146.67
PSOc 2.97 0.18 2 3 23219.00 5208.07 18020.00 45530.00
PSOi 3.00 0.00 3 3 30966.67 2170.56 27860.00 34140.00
Table 7
Results for Test Problem 1 with multistart
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 2.57 0.50 2 3 3344.69 731.87 2234.00 4642.50
DE1 2.43 0.50 2 3 4796.33 1124.29 3400.00 7050.00
DE2 2.70 0.47 2 3 8708.00 2551.35 6046.67 13970.00
DE3 2.43 0.50 2 3 6220.22 1556.19 3793.33 10430.00
DE4 2.77 0.43 2 3 5085.78 1330.14 3660.00 7970.00
DE5 2.57 0.50 2 3 9749.89 2965.66 5793.33 15820.00
DE6 2.70 0.47 2 3 9478.67 2654.48 6793.33 15290.00
PSOc 2.67 0.48 2 3 6265.56 1849.13 4293.33 10020.00
PSOi 2.47 0.51 2 3 23998.56 5630.68 16986.67 32030.00
size and generations per restart were problem dependent and the setup used in the numerical experiments
is summarized in Table 5.
4.4. Presentation of the results
To evaluate the comparative performance of CMA-ES, DE, and PSO, on each test problem, we com-
pared the performance of each algorithmwith respect to the number of (different)Nash equilibria detected,
as well as, with respect to the mean number of function evaluation required to compute a different Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, on each test problem we investigated the performance differences caused by the
choice between the deﬂection and the multistart technique. For each test problem, and for each choice
between deﬂection and restart, 30 numerical experiments were performed for each of the considered
algorithms. All results are reported in Tables 6–17. Each table reports the mean, the standard devia-
tion (), the minimum (min), and maximum (max) number of different Nash equilibria detected, and
the corresponding values for the number of function evaluations required to compute a distinct Nash
equilibrium.
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Table 8
Results for Test Problem 2 with deﬂection
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 4.27 0.45 4 5 9588.79 1395.51 6927.80 11692.50
DE1 4.73 0.45 4 5 22657.00 3933.48 15432.00 29865.00
DE2 4.30 0.47 4 5 32609.63 4529.02 24388.00 40230.00
DE3 4.63 0.49 4 5 25435.27 4164.88 19844.00 32955.00
DE4 4.33 0.48 4 5 28687.27 4971.97 19860.00 36610.00
DE5 0.87 0.51 0 2 — — — —
DE6 4.47 0.51 4 5 34362.23 5270.18 26620.00 43985.00
PSOc 4.67 0.48 4 5 24504.73 4703.46 19288.00 34285.00
PSOi 4.90 0.31 4 5 30276.07 2628.65 28120.00 37910.00
Table 9
Results for Test Problem 2 with multistart
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 3.33 0.76 2 5 3090.94 736.69 1991.40 4873.50
DE1 3.37 0.85 2 5 7069.79 2063.60 4072.00 11046.67
DE2 2.73 0.74 1 4 35206.72 16168.87 17480.00 97740.00
DE3 2.83 0.65 2 4 15888.28 6360.15 7766.67 29800.00
DE4 3.30 0.84 2 5 29414.12 13156.15 7408.00 75290.00
DE5 0.97 0.41 0 2 — — — —
DE6 2.87 0.73 2 4 43101.39 14224.91 25795.00 71750.00
PSOc 3.40 0.86 2 5 11973.08 3660.57 7348.00 20610.00
PSOi 3.23 0.73 2 5 39025.94 10225.40 24516.00 69670.00
Table 10
Results for Test Problem 3 with deﬂection
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 3.03 0.89 2 5 19778.25 7116.49 9223.80 30626.50
DE1 3.10 0.55 2 4 218134.03 62594.70 118787.50 369475.00
DE2 1.20 0.71 0 3 — — — —
DE3 3.17 0.75 2 4 227278.33 78168.94 137712.50 377850.00
DE4 3.03 0.72 2 5 253272.33 85881.17 108470.00 432625.00
DE5 1.63 0.76 0 3 — — — —
DE6 2.57 0.82 1 4 376246.53 207052.30 160337.50 941800.00
PSOc 3.00 0.69 2 4 255346.25 91762.29 107550.00 422075.00
PSOi 3.37 0.72 2 5 255715.97 70688.00 139450.00 451250.00
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Table 11
Results for Test Problem 3 with multistart
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 2.43 0.90 1 4 13076.37 6503.76 4426.50 28458.00
DE1 2.40 0.81 1 4 57805.69 59371.86 17075.00 342550.00
DE2 1.67 0.71 0 3 — — — —
DE3 2.37 0.72 1 4 66788.47 36564.10 20487.50 189000.00
DE4 2.77 0.68 1 4 74955.14 48618.67 24600.00 252400.00
DE5 1.47 0.68 0 3 — — — —
DE6 2.50 0.82 1 4 340859.44 222252.48 156475.00 936450.00
PSOc 2.50 0.63 2 4 78288.75 33132.98 38600.00 157825.00
PSOi 2.30 0.60 1 3 226939.72 78364.01 148750.00 495450.00
Table 12
Results for Test Problem 4 with deﬂection
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 7.37 0.93 6 9 4871.85 1597.16 2091.00 8202.50
DE1 6.70 1.09 4 9 8977.96 3176.34 4145.00 17247.50
DE2 7.17 1.05 5 9 9783.33 2956.87 5838.75 17442.00
DE3 7.27 0.87 6 9 9983.27 2640.40 6037.50 15616.67
DE4 7.90 0.76 7 9 7036.02 1814.05 3757.78 11135.71
DE5 6.80 1.13 4 9 14986.52 4051.78 8363.33 30562.50
DE6 7.57 0.90 5 9 9568.29 2586.73 6322.22 18076.00
PSOc 7.03 0.76 5 8 8569.21 1838.82 5630.00 14886.00
PSOi 6.90 0.96 5 8 15026.70 3084.20 10991.25 21912.00
Table 13
Results for Test Problem 4 with multistart
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 2.70 0.65 2 4 3194.14 715.61 2052.75 4408.50
DE1 2.73 0.64 2 4 6281.19 3456.75 2752.50 14680.00
DE2 2.77 0.73 2 4 11211.28 3456.54 6526.67 18205.00
DE3 2.53 0.57 2 4 11934.17 4423.44 6950.00 23745.00
DE4 3.03 0.85 2 4 11633.22 4497.53 6105.00 26060.00
DE5 2.70 0.70 2 4 37830.64 11964.14 19560.00 65805.00
DE6 2.80 0.81 2 5 16947.42 6346.54 8095.00 32090.00
PSOc 2.93 0.58 2 4 7455.39 1701.89 5442.50 10565.00
PSOi 2.07 0.45 1 4 40458.78 9647.80 18715.00 82550.00
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Table 14
Results for Test Problem 5 with deﬂection
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 10.30 0.60 9 12 2303.75 490.27 1556.82 3482.10
DE1 10.40 0.62 10 12 4798.46 1023.89 3511.67 8140.00
DE2 10.57 0.63 10 12 9279.43 1045.27 7665.00 11436.00
DE3 10.47 0.57 10 12 5697.87 1306.27 4121.82 10224.00
DE4 9.10 1.06 7 10 21072.97 7679.69 9866.00 36940.00
DE5 0.73 1.53 0 8 — — — —
DE6 10.17 0.38 10 11 17023.22 3706.66 9872.73 22782.00
PSOc 10.53 0.78 9 12 5598.80 844.73 4290.00 7450.00
PSOi 10.50 0.51 10 11 15116.76 1009.87 13783.64 16912.00
Table 15
Results for Test Problem 5 with multistart
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 1.77 0.86 1 4 7753.11 3252.50 2863.75 11882.00
DE1 1.30 0.53 1 3 39076.33 11198.85 14360.00 51900.00
DE2 1.70 0.65 1 3 97813.78 41449.85 41866.67 167720.00
DE3 1.33 0.55 1 3 62016.11 18262.06 21433.33 91640.00
DE4 1.93 0.78 1 4 149817.17 75240.08 53565.00 310060.00
DE5 0.27 0.52 0 2 — — — —
DE6 1.53 0.82 1 4 203752.00 74901.93 60800.00 289700.00
PSOc 1.40 0.50 1 2 33819.00 10338.13 20350.00 44820.00
PSOi 1.23 0.43 1 2 134998.00 32606.27 76110.00 160380.00
Table 16
Results for Test Problem 6 with deﬂection
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 13.93 0.58 13 15 2200.47 269.03 1671.21 2787.13
DE1 13.90 0.71 12 15 3863.48 594.87 2939.33 5440.00
DE2 13.80 0.48 13 15 5217.48 609.81 4358.57 6937.69
DE3 13.97 0.61 13 15 5835.41 917.29 4361.43 7510.00
DE4 13.70 0.75 12 15 5054.90 595.60 4272.14 6483.08
DE5 11.87 1.14 8 13 9522.17 2106.37 7140.00 18767.50
DE6 13.60 0.67 12 15 5358.69 682.98 4482.14 7304.62
PSOc 14.20 0.89 12 15 3047.69 347.04 2540.00 3834.62
PSOi 14.33 0.48 14 15 6815.01 237.90 6276.00 7197.86
128 N.G. Pavlidis et al. / Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 175 (2005) 113–136
Table 17
Results for Test Problem 6 with multistart
Method Nash equilibria Function evaluations per equilibrium
Mean  Min Max Mean  Min Max
CMA-ES 5.90 0.96 4 8 2990.22 531.53 2142.38 4549.00
DE1 6.33 1.12 4 9 6613.78 1598.33 4415.00 12607.50
DE2 6.43 1.28 4 9 11267.65 3036.64 6545.56 18670.00
DE3 5.47 1.38 2 8 14720.26 6609.17 6441.25 41225.00
DE4 6.97 1.16 4 9 12314.96 3164.66 8338.89 20575.00
DE5 6.87 1.25 5 9 20609.33 4637.34 14332.22 32652.00
DE6 6.33 1.03 5 8 12927.57 2583.13 9397.50 18496.00
PSOc 5.33 1.12 2 7 6499.35 2123.42 4395.71 15865.00
PSOi 4.60 1.07 2 6 21526.97 7461.19 14948.33 46365.00
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Fig. 1. Nash equilibria detected with deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP1.
To obtain a clearer image of the statistical properties of the obtained results, we also provide boxplots,
in Figs. 1–6 for the detected Nash equilibria, and in Figs. 7–12 for the number of function evaluations.
Each box corresponds to an instance of one of the considered algorithms, and it has lines at the lower
quartile, median, and upper quartile values. The whiskers, i.e. the lines extending from each end of the
box, show the extent covered by the remaining values. Outliers appear beyond the ends of the whiskers,
and they are denoted with crosses. Notches represent a conﬁdence interval for the medians for box to box
comparison.
As we can see from Table 6, the DE variants 4, 5, and 6, as well as the inertia weight version of
PSO (PSOi) are capable of detecting all 3 Nash equilibria of Test Problem 1 in every run. Moreover, no
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Fig. 2. Nash equilibria detected with deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP2.
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Fig. 3. Nash equilibria detected with deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP3.
algorithm found less than 2 equilibria in a single run. Performing aKruskal–Wallis statistical test [8] on the
results, the null hypothesis that the median performance of all the algorithms is identical, was not rejected
(p-value equal to 0.634). It is important to note at this point that this hypothesis was rejected in all the
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Fig. 4. Nash equilibria detected with deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP4.
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Fig. 5. Nash equilibria detected with deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP5.
other cases. Comparing the results of Table 6 with those of Table 7 we observe that deﬂection marginally
improves the capability of all the algorithms to compute different minimizers. CMA-ES proved to be
the computationally cheapest method. This ﬁnding, which is also valid for all the other test problems,
was expected since in our experimental setting CMA-ES required the smallest number of individuals
compared to DE and PSO.
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Fig. 6. Nash equilibria detected with deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP6.
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Fig. 7. Function evaluations for deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP1.
Regarding Test Problem 2, the best performing method with respect to the number of different mini-
mizers detected was PSOi, when deﬂection was used, and the constriction factor version of PSO (PSOc)
when multistart was used.As can be seen from Tables 8 and 9, deﬂection ensured a superior performance
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Fig. 8. Function evaluations for deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP2.
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Fig. 9. Function evaluations for deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP3.
than multistart, since all algorithms (with the exception of DE5) managed to compute at least 4 out of 5
equilibria. This is more clearly shown in Fig. 2. Function evaluations per equilibrium are not reported for
DE5 since the algorithm was incapable of detecting even one equilibrium in some occasions.
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Fig. 10. Function evaluations for deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP4.
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Fig. 11. Function evaluations for deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP5.
Similar results were obtained for Test Problem 3, as shown in Tables 10 and 11. PSOi proved the best
performing method when equipped with deﬂection. On the other hand, DE4 gave the best results for
multistart. A poor performance was exhibited by DE2 and DE5. On Test Problem 4, Tables 12 and 13,
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Fig. 12. Function evaluations for deﬂection (left) and multistart (right) for TP6.
DE4 proved the best performing method when equipped with either deﬂection or multistart. The same
was observed for Test Problems 5 and 6 with multistart, while for the deﬂection case, DE2 and PSOi
performed better, respectively.
Overall, the obtained results suggest that incorporating the deﬂection technique improves signiﬁcantly
the ability of the considered methods to detect different minimizers, compared to multistart. DE4 exhibits
the best overall performance when multistart is used. When equipped with the deﬂection technique, the
best performing methods appear to be DE4, PSOi and PSOc. An interesting point to note is that on
this set of problems, the DE variants that exploit the best individual of the population in the mutation
strategy (DE1, DE3, and DE4) overall exhibited a superior performance. In the context of computational
intelligence methods, this property is known as elitism. Finally, the least computationally expensive
method per computed minimizer, was CMA-ES.
5. Conclusions
The concept of Nash equilibrium is central in game theory. In this contribution the effectiveness of
three computational intelligence methods, namely CMA-ES, PSO, and DE, was investigated on the task
of locating and computing the Nash equilibria of ﬁnite strategic games. To employ these methods the
global optimization formulation of the problem of computingNash equilibria was adopted. To detectmore
than one Nash equilibria in a single run, the multistart and the deﬂection techniques for the computation
of more than one global minimizers of a function, were employed.
In all the test problems, the deﬂection technique enhanced signiﬁcantly the performance of the consid-
ered methods compared to multistart. This ﬁnding becomes more pronounced as the number of equilibria
increases. In most cases, the methods that exploit the best individuals of the current population to produce
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the population of the next generation, tended to exhibit superior performance. Overall, the two versions
of PSO and the DE variants that exploit the best individual in the mutation strategy, exhibited the most
robust behavior with respect to the number of different equilibria detected. The CMA-ES was the least
computationally expensive method per computed minimizer.
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